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Abstract
The proportional Shapley value (Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017; Gangolly 1981) is an
proportional counterpart to the Shapley value (Shapley 1953b) in cooperative games.
As shown in Besner (2017a), the proportional Shapley value is a convincing non-linear
alternative, especially in cost allocation, if the stand alone worths of the players are
plausible weights.
To enable similar properties for cooperative games with a level structure, we generalize
this value. Therefore we adapt the proceeding applied to the weighted Shapley values
in Besner (2017b). We present, analogous to the four classes of weighted Shapley levels
values in Besner (2017b), four different values, the proportional Shapley hierarchy levels
value, the proportional Shapley support levels value, the proportional Shapley alliance
levels value and the proportional Shapley collaboration levels value, respectively.
Keywords Cooperative game · Level structure · (Proportional) Shapley (levels) value
· Proportionality · Component substitution · Dividends
1 Introduction
Winter (1989) introduced a model, called level structures, for hierarchical cooperation
structures, like in political organisations, governmental authorities or hierarchical orga-
nized groups, and presented the Shapley levels value for cooperative games with a level
structure. This value generalizes the Shapley value (Shapley 1953b) and the Owen value
(Owen 1977), respectively. The Shapley levels value distributes in the sum the same pay-
off to the players of symmetric components which are subsets of the same component in
an induced game where some components are the players.
Often coalitions have not the same power if they act as players. If there exist related
exogenous given weights, the weighted Shapley levels values, presented in Besner (2017a)
can used for games with a level structure.
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2But sometimes the weights are inherent to the coalition function, for example in cost
games. Besides the proportional rule (Moriarity 1975), the proportional value (Feldman
1999; Ortmann 2000) provides one possibility to divide benefits or costs in cooperative
games in a proportional manner, regarding the worths of the players. Huettner (2015)
generalized this value to games with a coalition structure1. Recently, there was a redis-
covery of the proportional Shapley value (Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017; Gangolly 1981),
a weighted value where the worths of the singletons are the weights. Thus, this value
takes proportionality into account too. Convincing axioms and characterizations (Besner
2017a; Be´al et al. 2017) recommend this value for games where the weights are the stand
alone worths of the players.
It speaks for itself, therefore, to generalize the proportional Shapley value to cooperative
games with a level structure. We proceed thereby in analogy to the weighted Shapley levels
values, presented in Besner (2017b)2: if in Besner (2017b, algorithm 5.1) the weights for
the coalitions, acting as players in the used weighted Shapley values, are replaced by the
worths of the coalitions, we obtain the proportional Shapley hierarchy levels value and,
if we replace in the definitions of the other three classes the weights of the coalitions by
the worths of the coalitions, we receive the proportional Shapley support levels value,
the proportional Shapley alliance levels value and the proportional Shapley collaboration
levels value, respectively.
The proportional Shapley hierarchy levels value can be characterized by efficiency and
proportional balanced group contributions, a proportional variant of balanced group con-
tributions (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter 1996) which can be used, together with efficiency,
to characterize the Shapley levels value. This first value doesn’t satisfy dummy. All four
values are efficient and non-linear. Therefore, in contrast to the respective weighted Shap-
ley levels values, the proportional Shapley support levels value, the proportional Shapley
alliance levels value and the proportional Shapley collaboration levels value are not in
the Harsanyi set (Hammer 1977; Vasil’ev 1978), but meet also dummy. They satisfy only
weaker forms of additivity and thus the characterizations of the related weighted Shap-
ley levels values are not transferable one to one. Nevertheless, with a new extension of
the dummy axiom, called loyalty, we get comparable axiomatizations. In the case of the
proportional Shapley support levels value we present also a characterization which uses a
component substitution property, extending the player splitting axiom in Besner (2017a).
The opening words from each related chapter in Besner (2017b) can be adapted, so we
keep it short.
The plan of this paper is derived from Besner (2017b) and is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 contains the preliminaries and section 3 presents new properties and used axioms.
In the following sections we introduce the values, in section 4 the proportional Shapley hi-
erarchy levels value, in section 5 the proportional Shapley support levels value, in section 6
the proportional Shapley alliance levels value and in section 7 the Shapley collaboration
levels value. Section 8 gives a conclusion. An appendix (section 9) provides all the proofs.
1In Besner (2016, subsection 5.5.1) this value is extended to games with a level structure.
2All new values in this paper are special cases of classes of values for level structures, proposed first in
Besner (2016), which also contain the weighted Shapley levels values given in Besner (2017b).
32 Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers, by R++ the set of all positive real numbers and by Q++
the set of all positive rational numbers. Let U be a countably infinite set, the universe
of all players, and denote by N the set of all non-empty and finite subsets of U. A
cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v) consisting of a set
of players N ∈ N and a coalition function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0. We refer to a TU-game
also only by v. The subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions, v(S) is the worth of coalition S
and the set of all nonempty subsets of S is denoted by ΩS. The set of all TU-games with
player set N is denoted by GN and, if v({i}) > 0 for all i ∈ N , by GN0 . The restriction
of (N, v) to the player set S ∈ ΩN is denoted by (S, v).
Let N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅. (1)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). We call a coalition S ⊆ N active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0.
Player i ∈ N is called a dummy player if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}), S ⊆ N\{i};
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called symmetric in v, if v(T ∪ {i}) = v(T ∪ {j}), and
weakly dependent (Besner 2017a) if v(T ∪ {k}) = v(T ) + v({k}), k ∈ {i, j}, for all
T ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A partition B of the player set N is called a coalition structure on N . Each B ∈ B
is called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player i ∈ N . A
level structure (Winter 1989) on N is a finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition
structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, on N such that:
• B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N}.
• Bh+1 = {N}.
• For each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br is a refinement of Br+1, i. e. Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N .
Br is called the r-th level of B; B is the set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels
Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h; Br(i) is called the r-th component, Bh(i) the top component3
containing player i ∈ N and, if S ∈ ΩN is a subset of a component of the r-th level, Br(S)
is the component of the r-th level which contains the coalition S.
The collection of all level structures with player set N is denoted by LN. A TU-game
(N, v) ∈ GN together with a level structure B ∈ LN is an LS-game (N, v,B). If N and B
are clear we refer to an LS-game also only by v. The set of all LS-games on N is denoted
by GLN, by GLN0 if v(B) > 0 for all B ∈ B, by GLN0Q if v(B) ∈ Q++ for all B ∈ B, and by
GLN0+ if v(S) > 0 for all S ∈ ΩB and all B ∈ Bh.
Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and T ∈ ΩN :
• From a level structure on N follows a restricted level structure on T by eliminating
the players in N\T . With coalition structures Br|T := {B ∩ T : B∈ Br, B ∩ T 6= ∅},
3In some respects we consider the (h + 1)-th level not as an regular level of the level structure.
40 ≤ r ≤ h+1, the new level structure on T is given by B|T := {B0|T , ...,Bh+1|T} ∈ LT
and (T, v,B|T ) ∈ GLT is called the restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
• We denote by BrI |T , 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, the coalition structure on T, given by
BrI |T :=
{
{T}, if r = h+ 1,{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ (Br∩ T ), Br∈ Br, B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ⊆ (Br∩ T )}, else.
With the level structure BI |T = {B0I |T , ...,Bh+1I |T} ∈ LT the LS-game (T, v,BI |T ) ∈
GLT is called the internally induced restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
• We define Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the induced r-th level
structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players, where Brk :={{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ B′} : B′ ∈ Br+k}, 0 ≤ k ≤ h + 1 − r. If T = ⋃B⊆T B, B ∈ Br,
and we want to stress this property, T is denoted by T r. Each such T r is related
to a coalition of all players B ∈ Br, B ⊆ T r, in the induced r-th level structure,
denoted by T r := {B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r} and vice versa. The induced r-th level game(Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr is given by
vr(T r) := v(T r) for all T r∈ ΩBr. (2)
• We define Br :=
{B0, ...,Br, {N}} ∈ LN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the r-th cut level structure
from B if we cut out all levels between the r-th and the (h+ 1)-th level. (N, v,Br)
is called the r-th cut of (N, v,B).
Note that we have for each B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} also B = Bh, each TU-game (N, v) corre-
sponds to an LS-game (N, v,B0) with a trivial level structure B0 := {B0,B1} and Br
denotes the set of all components B ∈ B` of all levels B` ∈ B, 0 ≤ ` ≤ r.
A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns to any v ∈ GN, N ∈ N , a payoff vector
φ(N, v) ∈ RN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns payoff vectors ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN
to all LS-games (N, v, B) ∈ GLN. The Shapley value Sh (Shapley 1953b) is given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
Let W := {f : U → R++} with wi := w(i) for all w ∈ W and i ∈ U. For w ∈ W, the
(simply) weighted Shapley value4 Shw (Shapley 1953a) is given by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . The proportional Shapley value Shp (Besner 2016; Be´al et
al. 2017; Gangolly 1981) is given by
Shpi (v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
4We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987)
5Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where
KrT (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
The Shapley levels value ShL (Winter 1989) is given by5
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
3 Axioms and Properties
We introduce two new properties for players. The first one plays a basic role in this paper
and is an extension of a dummy player.
Definition 3.1. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN and v ∈ GLN a player i ∈ N is called a
loyal player (to the top component) in (N, v,B), if
MCvi (S ∪ T ) = MCvi (S) for all S ⊆ Bh(i)\{i}, T ⊆ N\Bh(i). (3)
It is evident, if B = B0, that a loyal player coincides with a dummy player who is only loyal
to herself. A loyal player is loyal to the top component containing her in the sense that
she is not interested to join a coalition outside the top component. In all such coalitions
she acts only passively. The following lemma stresses the naming of a loyal player: outside
the top component containing the loyal player all coalitions where the loyal player is a
member are not active in v.
Lemma 3.2. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN. Player i ∈ N is a loyal player in
(N, v,B), iff ∆v(R) = 0 for all R ⊆ N, R * Bh(i), R 3 i.
For the proof, see appendix 9.1. The second new property generalizes weakly dependent.
Definition 3.3. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and v ∈ GLN. Players i, j ∈
N, i 6= j, are called dependent outside the r-th component (short rc-dependent)
in (N, v,B), if
MCvk(Sk) = MC
v
k
(Br(k)∩ Sk) for all Sk ∈ ΩN\{i,j}, Sk * Br(k), k ∈ {i, j}.
If r = h we call the players dependent outside the top component (short tc-
dependent).
Obviously dependent outside the zeroth component coincides with weakly dependent.
This definition has the interpretation that an rc-dependent player is only interested to
join a coalition outside the r-th component if all rc-dependent players are in the joined
coalition. The following lemma reveals this relationship.
5This formula is presented in Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, eq. (1)).
6Lemma 3.4. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and v ∈ GLN. Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j,
are rc-dependent in (N, v,B), iff ∆v(Sk ∪ {k}) = 0 for all Sk ∈ ΩN\{i,j}, Sk * Br(k), k ∈
{i, j}.
For the proof, see appendix 9.2. Now we can present the axioms6.
Efficiency, E. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Dummy, D. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and i ∈ N a dummy player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = v({i}).
Loyalty, L7. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and i ∈ N a loyal player in v, we
have
ϕi(N, v,B) =
{
v({i}), if h = 0,
ϕi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i)), else.
Dummy player out, DO8 For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, j ∈ N a dummy
player in v, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}
)
for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Internal (induced restriction) dummy player out, IDO8. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN,
v ∈ GLN, j ∈ N a dummy player in v, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}
)
for
all i ∈ N\{j}.
Loyal player out, LO8. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, j ∈ N a loyal player in
v and i ∈ N\{j}, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) =

ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}
)
, if Bh(i) 6= Bh(j),
ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}
)
+ ϕi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i))
−ϕi
(Bh(i)\{j}, v,Bh−1|Bh(i)\{j}), else.
Internal (induced restriction) loyal player out, ILO8. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN,
v ∈ GLN, j ∈ N a loyal player in v and i ∈ N\{j}, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) =

ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}
)
, if Bh(i) 6= Bh(j),
ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}
)
+ ϕi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1I |Bh(i))
−ϕi
(Bh(i)\{j}, v,Bh−1I |Bh(i)\{j}), else.
Homogeneity, H. For all N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ GLN and scalars α ∈ R, we have
ϕ(N,αv,B) = αϕ(N, v,B).
Weak LS-additivity, WA9. For all N ∈ N , B ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈ GLN, v′(B) = c · v(B) for
all B ∈ B, c > 0, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
6In the case of using a subdomain, we require an axiom to hold when all games belong to this subdomain.
7This is also an extension of dummy.
8These axioms extend dummy player out (Tijs and Driessen, 1986) which is related to null player out in
Derks and Haller (1999)..
9These are extensions of weak additivity (Besner 2017a).
7Completely weak LS-additivity, CWA9. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈
GLN, v′(S) = c · v(S) for all S ⊆ B, B ∈ Bh, c > 0, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Proportional balanced group contributions, PBGC10. For all N ∈ N, B = Bh ∈
LN, v ∈ GLN0 and Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`)
v(Bk)
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk)
v(B`)
.
Symmetry between components, SymBC11 (Winter 1989). For all N ∈ N , B =
Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), and Bk, B` are
symmetric in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
Proportionality between components, PBC12. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈
GLN0 , Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), and Bk, B` are weakly dependent
in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr0 , we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
v(Bk)
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
v(B`)
.
Proportionality within components, PWC12. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈
GLN0 , Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and all i ∈ Bk ∪ B` are rc-
dependent in v, we have ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
v(Bk)
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
v(B`)
.
Proportional top components contributions, PTCC12. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈
LN, v ∈ GLN0 , k, ` ∈ N, Br(k),Br(`) ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and all
i ∈ Br(k) ∪ Br(`) are tc-dependent in v, we have
ϕk(N, v,B)
v({k}) =
ϕ`(N, v,B)
v({`}) , if h = 0, and∑
i∈Br(k)
ϕi(N, v,B)− ϕi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i))
v
(Br(k)) = ∑
i∈Br(`)
ϕi(N, v,B)− ϕi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i))
v
(Br(`)) , else.
Level game property, LG (Winter 1989). For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN,
B ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br).
10This axiom extends proportional balanced contributions (Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017) and is related to
balanced group contributions (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter 1996), an extension of balanced contributions
(Myerson 1980).
11Winter (1989) called this axiom coalitional symmetry.
12These axioms extend proportionality in Besner (2017a).
84 The proportional Shapley hierarchy levels value
In Besner (2017b) the weighted Shapley levels value, presented in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-
Puga (2011), is extended to the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values. It is not difficult
to adapt these values to a proportional value for level structures. We have only to assign
in the defining algorithm each weight of a coalition the original worth of the coalition.
Definition 4.1. Let N ∈ N and (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0+. Then the proportional Shapley
hierarchy levels value ShpHL is defined by algorithm 4.1 below.
Algorithm 4.1. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0+ , i ∈ N , w ∈ W such that wS :=
v(S) for all S ∈ ΩBh and all Bh ∈ Bh if S is regarded as a player, Shw a weighted Shapley
value and (R, v˜ri ) TU-games, where R are nonempty, pairwise disjoint sets of some subsets
S ∈ ΩBr(i), 1 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, with v˜ri (Q) := vri
(⋃
S∈Q S
)
for all Q ∈ ΩR, vri ∈ GBr(i). Take
vh+1i := v.
• Step k, 1 ≤ k ≤ h: Let r := h− k + 1. We define the TU-game (Br(i), vri ) by
vri (T ) := Sh
w
T
({
B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Br+1(i), B 6= Br(i)} ∪ {T}, v˜r+1i ) for all T ∈ ΩBr(i).
In particular, vri
(Br(i)) is the payoff assigned to component Br(i).
• Step h+1: The payoff ShpHL assigned to player i is given by
ShpHLi (N, v,B) := Shw{i}
({B ∈ B0 : B ⊆ B1(i)}, v˜1i ).
If h = 0, we only execute step h+ 1.
Remark 4.2. It is obvious, by construction, that ShpHL satisfies E and LG. If B = B0
ShpHL coincides with Shp and so ShpHL is not additive too. It is easy to show, with a
little example, that ShpHL doesn’t satisfy D.
For a fixed coalition function well-known facts of a weighted Shapley value hold also
for the proportional Shapley value. We get similar results for the proportional Shapley
hierarchy levels value and the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values (Besner 2017b).
Corollary 4.3. Let N ∈ N and (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0+. ShpHL is the unique LS-value that
satisfies E and PBGC.
The proof is omitted because for a fixed coalition function we can replace the weights of
the coalitions in a weighted Shapley hierarchy levels value by the worths of the coalitions
and so we have a corollary to Besner (2017b, theorem 5.3).
5 The proportional Shapley support levels value
Just like the weighted Shapley support levels values (Besner 2017b), by the following value
each player is ”supported” by all components including her.
9Definition 5.1. Let N ∈ N, B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0 and for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
Kv,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Krv,T (i), where (4)
Krv,T (i) :=
v
(Br(i))∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
. (5)
The proportional Shapley support levels value ShpSL is given by
ShpSLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (6)
Obviously, if B = B0, ShpSL coincides with Shp. We present a set of axioms which are
matched by this value.
Theorem 5.2. The proportional Shapley support levels value ShpSL satisfies E, D, L,
H, WA, LG, SymBC, PBC, PWC and PTCC.
For the proof, see appendix 9.3. We would like to draw attention to the fact that also
symmetry between components is satisfied. If a level structure is defined as above, so
that the singletons are the elements of the lowest level, Winter (1989, remark 1.6) empha-
sized that the individual symmetry can be dropped for the standard axiomatization of the
Shapley levels value. So the used axioms, efficiency, null player, symmetry between com-
ponents and additivity, differ from the corresponding ones, satisfied by the proportional
Shapley support levels value, only in the range (dummy instead of null player) and in
the weaker form of additivity. Besner (2017a, theorem 5.3) axiomatized the proportional
Shapley value by the efficiency, dummy, proportionality and weak additivity axioms for
TU-values. If we extend these axioms to axioms for LS-values follows a ”proportional”
analogon to Winter’s axiomatization.
Theorem 5.3. ShpSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, L, PBC and WA.
For the proof, see appendix 9.4.
5.1 Component substitution
One of the most remarkable properties of the proportional Shapley value is the satisfaction
of the player splitting axiom (Besner 2017a). If a player splits in two new players which
have in the sum the same effect to the other players as the splitted player before, in
Besner (2017a) such a game is called a splitted player game, the payoff to uninvolved
players doesn’t change. We repeat the definition of a splitted player game.
Definition 5.4. (Besner 2017a) Let N,N j ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, (N j, vj) ∈ GNj, j ∈
N, k, ` ∈ N j, k, ` /∈ N, N j := (N\{j}) ∪ {k, `}. The game (N j, vj) is called a split-
ted player game to (N, v) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}
• vj({k}) + vj({`}) = v({j}),
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• vj(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + vj({i}), i ∈ {k, `},
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}) and
• vj(S) = v(S).
By Banker (1981), an allocation scheme should not be sensitive to the way cost centres
are organized. For splitted player games the following axiom satisfies Bankers demand.
Player splitting, PS. (Besner 2017a) For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, j ∈ N and a splitted
player game (N j, vj) ∈ GNj to (N, v), we have
ϕi(N, v) = ϕi(N
j, vj) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
This should hold also if the cost centres are structured hierarchically. We extend the
definition of a splitted player game to LS-games.
Definition 5.5. Let N, NB ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, BB = BhB ∈ LNB, v ∈ GLN, vB ∈
GLNB, B ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, B′, B′′ ( U, B′ ∩ (N\B) = B′′ ∩ (N\B) = B′ ∩ B′′ =
∅, NB = (N\B) ∪B′ ∪B′′, such that
(BB)q=(Bq\{Bq}) ∪ {(BB)q}, B⊆ Bq∈ Bq, (BB)q = (Bq\B) ∪B′ ∪B′′
in the q-th level of BB, r ≤ q ≤ h+ 1. The game (NB, vB,BB) ∈ GLNB is called a compo-
nent substitution game (CS-game) to (N, v,B) if for all S, S =
⋃
Br⊆S,
Br∈Br
Br, S ∩B = ∅,
• vB(B′) + vB(B′′) = v(B),
• vB(S ∪B′ ∪B′′) = v(S ∪B),
• vB(S) = v(S) and
• vB(S ∪ C) = v(S) + vB(C), C ∈ {B′, B′′}.
It is evident, if B = B0, that a CS-game coincides with a splitted player game.
Remark 5.6. In the CS-game the worth of all coalitions which have not only components
of the r-th level as subsets is arbitrary within the domain. The structure of the components
of all levels lower then r must only be conform with the definition of a level structure.
Remark 5.7. In the induced r-th level game of the CS-game the substituting components
are weakly dependent. If the substituted component is a singleton and is replaced by sin-
gletons, the players of the substituting singletons are weakly dependent in the CS-game.
The r-th level game of the CS-game is a splitted player game to the original r-th level game
if we regard both games as TU-games. In the following axiom the payoff to members of
uninvolved components doesn’t change in the sum in a CS-game in relation to the original
game.
11
Component substitution, CS. For all N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, B ∈ Br, 0 ≤
r ≤ h, and (NB, vB,BB)∈ GLNB a CS-game to (N, v,B), we have∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N
B, vB,BB) for all Br ∈ (Br\{B}).
It is clear, if B = B0, that CS corresponds to PS.
Remark 5.8. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, B ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and (NB, vB,BB) ∈
GLNB a CS-game to (N, v,B) with related components B′ and B′′. If ϕ is an LS-value that
satisfies E and CS, then we have∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B′
ϕi(N
B, vB,BB) +
∑
i∈B′′
ϕi(N
B, vB,BB).
It turns out that the proportional Shapley support levels value is doing well with CS.
Proposition 5.9. ShpSL satisfies CS.
For the proof, see appendix 9.5. The following lemmas show dependence on SymBC and
PBC, respectively, for efficient LS-values which satisfy CS.
Lemma 5.10. Let N ∈ N and (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0 . If an LS-value ϕ satisfies E and CS
then ϕ satisfies also SymBC.
For the proof, see appendix 9.6.
Lemma 5.11. Let N ∈ N and (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0Q. If an LS-value ϕ satisfies E and CS
then ϕ satisfies also PBC.
For the proof, see appendix 9.7. We extend corollary 5.13 in Besner (2017a).
Corollary 5.12. Let N ∈ N and (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0Q. ShpSL is the unique LS-value that
satisfies E, L, CS and WA.
Obviously follows the proof by proposition 5.9 and lemma 5.11 from theorem 5.3.
Remark 5.13. Lemma 5.11 holds for v ∈ LGN0 if we require continuity of the LS-value
in v(B) for all v ∈ LGN0 and all B ∈ B in an additional axiom. So also corollary 5.12 is
valid for v ∈ LGN0 if there is required an additional continuity axiom.
6 The proportional Shapley alliance levels value
The following value allows a greater independence for subgroups of a component from the
nesting components.
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Definition 6.1. Let N ∈ N, B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0+ and for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
Av,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Arv,T (i), where
Arv,T (i) :=
v
(Br(i) ∩ T)∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B ∩ T ) .
The proportional Shapley alliance levels value ShpAL is given by
ShpALi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (7)
It is evident, if B = B0, that ShpAL coincides with Shp.
Theorem 6.2. The proportional Shapley alliance levels value ShpAL satisfies E, D, L,
H, DO, LO, CWA, PWC and PTCC.
For the proof, see appendix 9.8. If a value satisfies loyal player out, the loyal player has
no influence to the payoff of players which are not in the same top component as the loyal
player. If a player i is in the same top component as the loyal player, there is no difference
in the impact of the loyal player to the payoff of player i in the original game and the
restriction of the cut
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i)). The next axiomatization uses loyal player out.
Theorem 6.3. ShpAL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, LO, PTCC and CWA.
For the proof, see appendix 9.9.
7 The proportional Shapley collaboration levels value
Our last value allows each component to act independently from the including component.
Definition 7.1. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0 and for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i,
Cv,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Crv,T (i), with
Crv,T (i) :=
v(BrT(i))∑
B∈B̂r+1T (i)
v(B)
,
where BrT(i) is the largest component B`(i), 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, with B`(i) ⊆ T, Bh+1T (i) := T and
B̂r+1T (i):=
{
BrT (i), if BrT (i) = Br+1T (i),{
B ∈ B : B ( Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
, else,
is the set of all largest components which are subsets of Br+1T (i).
The proportional Shapley collaboration levels value ShpCL is given by
ShpCLi (N, v,B) =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Cv,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
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Obviously, if B = B0, ShpCL coincides with Shp.
Theorem 7.2. The proportional Shapley collaboration levels value ShpCL satisfies E, D,
L, H, IDO, ILO, WA, PWC and PTCC.
The proof is omitted because it is analogous to the proof of theorem 6.2 or rather theo-
rem 5.2. The following axiomatization uses internal loyal player out.
Theorem 7.3. ShpCL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, ILO, PWC and WA.
For the proof, see appendix 9.10.
8 Conclusion
If B = B1, we get, with a simple reformulation of our values, also four new proportional
coalitional values for coalition structures with related axiomatizations, the proportional
Shapley hierarchy coalitional value, the proportional Shapley support coalitional value, the
proportional Shapley alliance coalitional value and the proportional Shapley collaboration
coalitional value.
The proportional Shapley hierarchy levels value doesn’t satisfy the dummy axiom. This
means that a dummy player can get a payoff which is higher as her singleton worth.
Therefore players must obtain also shares of dividends from coalitions which do not contain
these players. In many situations it seems naturally that if a component supports subsets
of the component we should admit that the shares of dummy players,besides their singleton
worth, are not so null because the dummy players affect the supporting weight, here the
worth, of the component.13
The other three values satisfy the dummy player axiom. By the proportional Shapley
support levels value players of coalitions are also supported by possible dummy players
within components containing them. But the dummy players don’t receive a reward for
there assistance and it is easy to proof that this value doesn’t satisfy the dummy player
out property. Whereas for the weighted Shapley support levels values the weights of
components in restricted level structures, where a null player is removed, are not auto-
matically defined, here the worths of the restricted components are given. The restricted
components normally have a reduced worth and so a reduced weight for the proportional
Shapley support levels value. In contrary, looking at the weighted Shapley support levels
values, we can define a new weighted Shapley support levels value for the game with the
restricted level structure where the restricted components get the same weights as the
complete components in the original game with the unrestricted level structure. This is
especially true for the special case of the Shapley levels value where all components have
the same weight.
Our two last values, the proportional Shapley alliance levels value and the proportional
Shapley collaboration levels value, avoid this lack of receiving a reward for dummy players
because there is no support of dummy players to any other coalitions. This is confirmed
by the dummy player out properties of these values.
The extension of the property of player splitting to level structures was only examined
for the proportional Shapley support levels value. For this value we found that the
13For more details see also for the role of null players in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010).
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component substitution axiom is satisfied which allows an interesting axiomatization as
a corollary and gives a main difference, besides the proportionality between components
axiom, to the Shapley levels value. The introduction of extensions of the player splitting
axiom for the other LS-values is left to further research.
9 Appendix
Convention 9.1. To avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proves using PBC,
PWC or PTCC, if there is only one single player assessed in isolation she is defined
in this cases as weakly dependent (rc-dependent, tc-dependent) by herself. Then PBC,
PWC or PTCC can be used and are trivially satisfied.
9.1 Proof of lemma 3.2
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, i ∈ N, S ⊆ Bh(i)\{i}, and T ⊆ N\Bh(i).
Then exists an unique R ⊆ N, R * Bh(i), R 3 i with R = S ∪ T ∪ {i} and for each
R ⊆ N, R * Bh(i), R 3 i, exists an unique S and T above with R = S ∪T ∪{i}. If T = ∅
eq. (3) is trivially satisfied.
Let t := |T |, t ≥ 1. We show by an induction I1 on the size s := |S|
v(S ∪ T ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)⇔ ∆v(S ∪ T ∪ {i}) = 0.
Initialisation I1: Let S := ∅ and so s = 0. We use a second induction I2 on the size t.
Initialisation I2: Let t = 1. We get
v(S ∪ T ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
⇔ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) = v({i})
⇔
(1)
∑
Q⊆(T∪{i})
∆v(Q)−
∑
Q⊆T
∆v(Q) = ∆v({i})
⇔
∑
Q⊆(T∪{i}),Q3i
∆v(Q) = ∆v({i})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ T ∪ {i}) = 0.
Induction step I2: Assume that equality and such equivalence in the first and last line
of the system above hold for all coalitions T˜ ∈ ΩN\Bh(i), |T˜ | ≤ t′, t′ ≥ 1, (IH2) and let
t = t′ + 1. It follows
v(S ∪ T ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
⇔ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) = v({i})
⇔
(1)
∑
Q⊆(T∪{i})
∆v(Q)−
∑
Q⊆T
∆v(Q) = ∆v({i})
⇔
∑
Q⊆(T∪{i}),Q3i
∆v(Q) = ∆v({i})
⇔
(IH2)
∆v(S ∪ T ∪ {i}) = 0.
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Induction step I1: Assume that equality and such equivalence in the first and last line
of the system above hold for all coalitions S˜ ⊆ Bh(i)\{i}, |S˜| ≤ s′, s′ ≥ 0, (IH1) and let
s = s′ + 1. We get
v(S ∪ T ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
⇔
(1)
∑
Q⊆(S∪T∪{i})
∆v(Q)−
∑
Q⊆S∪T
∆v(Q) =
∑
Q⊆(S∪{i})
∆v(Q)−
∑
Q⊆S
∆v(Q)
⇔
∑
Q⊆(S∪T∪{i}),Q3i
∆v(Q) =
∑
Q⊆(S∪{i}),Q3i
∆v(Q)
⇔
(IH1)
∆v(S ∪ T ∪ {i}) = 0.
9.2 Proof of lemma 3.4
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, v ∈ GLN, i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, S ∈ ΩN\{i,j}, S * Br(i),
and T :=
(Br(i)∩ S). We show by induction on the size s := |S|, s ≥ 1,
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) ⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = 0.
Initialisation: Let s = 1. We have T = ∅ and get
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )
⇔ v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {i}) + ∆v(S) + ∆v({i}) = ∆v(S) + ∆v({i})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = 0.
Induction step: Assume that equivalence and equality in the first and last line of the
system above hold for all coalitions S˜ ∈ ΩN\{i,j}, |S˜| ≤ s′, s′ ≥ 1, (IH) and let s = s′+ 1.
We have T ( S and get
v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) =
(1)
∑
R⊆(T∪{i})
∆v(R)−
∑
R⊆T
∆v(R)
=
∑
R⊆T
∆v(R) +
∑
R⊆(T∪{i}), R3i
∆v(R)−
∑
R⊆T
∆v(R) =
(IH)
∆v({i}). (8)
It follows
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )
⇔
(1)
(8)
∆v(S ∪ {i}) +
∑
R((S∪{i})
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({i})
⇔
(IH)
∆v(S ∪ {i}) + ∆v({i}) +
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({i})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = 0.
Analogous with player j.
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Lemma 9.2 (Besner 2017b). Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Each
S ∈ ΩN is a subset of exactly one coalition T r ∈ ΩN, T r = ⋃Br⊆T r, Br∈Br,
Br∩S 6=∅
Br. Thus each
S ∈ ΩN is also uniquely referred to as ST r .
Lemma 9.3 (Besner 2017b). Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
and ST r the coalitions from lemma 9.2 with related coalitions T
r. Then we have in the
induced game (Br, vr,Br) for each T r∈ ΩBr, related to T r∈ ΩN,
∆vr(T r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Lemma 9.4 (Besner 2017a). Players i, j ∈ N are weakly dependent in v, v ∈ GN, iff
∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ∈ ΩN\{i,j}.
Remark 9.5. We can consider the collection of all LS-games (N, v,B) ∈ GLN, N ∈ N,
as a vector space R2n−1. Each game v is represented by a vector −→v ∈ R2n−1, where the
entries in the 2n− 1 coordinates of the 2n− 1 coalitions S ∈ ΩN get the worth v(S) of the
respective coalition S. Hence there exists for every game v a vector
−→
∆v ∈ R2n−1, which is
corresponding to the vector −→v , where the entries of the coordinates get the dividends of
the respective coalitions. By (1) we get with v, v1, v2 ∈ GN
−→
∆v =
−→
∆v1 +
−→
∆v2
⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆v1(S) + ∆v2(S) for all S ⊆ N
⇔ v(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v(R) = v1(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v1(R) + v2(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v2(R) for all S ⊆ N
⇔ v = v1 + v2.
Lemma 9.6. E and LO imply L.
Proof. Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN and ϕ an LS-value that satisfies E and LO.
It is well-known for a TU-value that efficiency and dummy player out imply dummy. So
lemma 9.6 is clear if h = 0. Let now h ≥ 1. We get for a loyal player j ∈ N
ϕj(N, v,B) =
(E)
v(N)−
∑
i∈N\({j})
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(LO)
v(N)−
∑
i∈N\({j})
ϕi
(
N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}
)
−
∑
i∈Bh(j)\{j}
[
ϕi
(Bh(j), v,Bh−1|Bh(j))− ϕi(Bh(j)\{j}, v,Bh−1|Bh(j)\{j})]
=
(E)
v(N)− v(N\{j})−
[
v
(Bh(j))− ϕj(Bh(j), v,Bh−1|Bh(j))− v(Bh(j)\{j})]
=
(1)
∑
S⊆N
∆v(S)−
∑
S⊆N\{j}
∆v(S)−
∑
S⊆Bh(j)
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆Bh(j)\{j}
∆v(S) + ϕj
(Bh(j), v,Bh−1|Bh(j))
=
Lem.
3.2
ϕj
(Bh(j), v,Bh−1|Bh(j)).
Lemma 9.7. E and ILO imply L.
The proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of lemma 9.6.
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9.3 Proof of theorem 5.2
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v, v′ ∈ GLN0 and Kv,T and Krv,T the expressions according to
def. 5.1.
• E: Let T ⊆ N, T 3 i, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Obviously we have
∑
j∈Br+1(i), j∈T
r∏
`=0
Krv,T (j) = 1.
Thus
∑
i∈T Kv,T (i) = 1 and it follows∑
i∈N
ShpSLi (N, v,B) =
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N,
T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N
∑
i∈T
Kv,T (i)∆v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N
∆v(T ) = v(N)
and E is shown.
• D: It is well-known fact that a player i ∈ N is a dummy player iff ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = 0
for all S ∈ ΩN\{i}. So by eq. (6) it’s obvious that D is satisfied.
• L: It’s obvious, by lemma 3.2 and eq. (6), that L is satisfied.
•H: It is well-known or easy to check by (1) that dividends are homogeneous, ∆αv(S) =
α∆v(S) for all S ⊆ N, α ∈ R. So we have
ShpSLi (N,αv,B) =
(6)
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kαv,T (i)∆αv(T ) = α
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T )
= αShpSLi (N, v,B) for all i ∈ N, α > 0.
• WA: Let v′(B) = c · v(B) for all B ∈ B, c > 0. It follows Krv,T = Krv′,T and thus
Kv,T = Kv′,T . So we have for all i ∈ N
ShpSLi (N, v,B) + ShpSLi (N, v′,B) =
(6)
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv′,T (i)∆v′(T )
=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv,T (i)
[
∆v(T ) + ∆v′(T )
]
=
Rem.
9.5
ShpSLi (N, v + v
′,B).
• LG: Let Br ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h + 1. If r = 0, LG trivially is satisfied because the 0-th
level game corresponds to the original LS-game, if r = h+ 1, LG is satisfied by E.
Let now 1 ≤ r ≤ h. We have for all S ⊆ N, S ∩Br 6= ∅,
∑
i∈Br, i∈S
r−1∏
`=0
K`v,S(i) = 1. (9)
In the game (Br, vr,Br) we have for all T r∈ ΩBr, Br∈ T r,
Kvr,T r(Br) =
h∏
`=r
K`−rvr,T r(B
r). (10)
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Let i ∈ Br, r ≤ ` ≤ h and ST r the coalitions from lemma 9.2. We have B`(i) = B`(Br).
Notice that for each T r⊆ Br, related to T r∈ ΩN, if i ∈ ST r also Br∈ T r. It follows for all
ST r ∈ ΩN, i ∈ ST r ,
K`v,STr (i) =(5)
v
(B`(i))∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(i),
B∩STr 6=∅
v(B)
=
Lem.
9.2
v
(B`(Br))∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(Br),
B∩T r 6=∅
v(B)
=
(2)
vr
(Br`−r(Br))∑
B∈Br`−r:B⊆Br`+1−r(Br),
B∩T r 6=∅
vr(B)
=
(5)
K`−rvr,T r(B
r). (11)
Thus we have for all ST r ∈ ΩN, Br∈ T r, T r∈ ΩBr,
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
Kv,STr (i) =
(4)
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
h∏
`=0
K`v,STr (i) =(11)
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
r−1∏
`=0
K`v,STr (i)
h∏
`=r
K`−rvr,T r(B
r)
=
(9)
h∏
`=r
K`−rvr,T r(B
r) =
(10)
Kvr,T r(Br). (12)
Finally we get∑
i∈Br
ShpSLi (N, v,B) =
(6)
∑
i∈Br
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
Kv,S(i)∆v(S) =
Lem.
9.2
∑
i∈Br
∑
STr⊆N,
STr3i
Kv,STr (i)∆v(ST r)
=
∑
STr⊆N
∑
i∈Br,
i∈STr
Kv,STr (i)∆v(ST r) =
(12)
∑
STr⊆N,T r3Br
Kvr,T r(Br)∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
9.2
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kvr,T r(Br)
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
9.3
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kvr,T r(Br)∆vr(T r) = ShpSLBr (Br, vr,Br).
• SymBC: We have, by (2), (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr0 , 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and Br(k),Br(`) symmetric in (Br, vr,Br). If r = 0 we have, as a well-
known fact, ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = ∆v(S ∪ {`}) for all S ⊆ N\{k, `} and get
ShpSLk (N, v,B) =
(6)
∑
T⊆N,T3k
Kv,T (k)∆v(T )
=
∑
S⊆N\{k,`}
Kv,S∪k(k)∆v(S ∪ k) +
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kv,T (k)∆v(T )
=
Def.
5.1
∑
S⊆N\{k,`}
Kv,S∪`(`)∆v(S ∪ `) +
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kv,T (`)∆v(T ) = Sh
pSL
` (N, v,B).
Thus we have also in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShpSLBr(k)(Br, vr,Br) = ShpSLBr(`)(Br, vr,Br)
and the claim follows by LG.
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• PBC: We have, by (2), (Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr0 , 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and Br(k),Br(`) weakly dependent in (Br, vr,Br). If r = 0 we get
ShpSLk (N, v,B)
v({k}) =(6)
∑
T⊆N,T3k
Kv,T (k)
v({k}) ∆v(T ) =Lem.
9.4
Kv,{k}(k) +
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kv,T (k)
v({k}) ∆v(T )
=
Def.
5.1
Kv,{`}(`) +
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kv,T (`)
v({`}) ∆v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N,T3`
Kv,T (`)
v({`}) ∆v(T ) =
ShpSL` (N, v,B)
v({`}) .
Thus we have also in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShpSLBr(k)(Br, vr,Br)
vr
({Br(k)}) = Sh
pSL
Br(`)(Br, vr,Br)
vr
({Br(`)})
and the claim follows by LG and (2).
• PWC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and all i ∈ Br(k)∪Br(`) rc-dependent
in v. We get
∑
i∈Br(k)
ShpSLi (N, v,B)
v
(Br(k)) =Def.
5.1
1
v
(Br(k)) ∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,T3i
[ h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
=
Lem.
3.4
1
v
(Br(k)) ∑
i∈Br(k)
[ ∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[ h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
+
∑
S⊆Br(k),
S3i
[ h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(S)
]
=
1
v
(Br(k)) ∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∑
i∈Br(k)
[ h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
+
1
v
(Br(k)) ∑
S⊆Br(k)
[∑
i∈S
h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(S)
=
1
v
(Br(k)) ∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
[
h∏
j=r
v
(Bj(k))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
·
∑
i∈Br(k)
r−1∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
14
]
+
∑
S⊆Br(k) ∆v(S)
v
(Br(k))
=
(1)
1
v
(Br(k)) ∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r
v
(Bj(k))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
+ 1
=
1
v
(Br(`)) ∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r
v
(Bj(`))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(`),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
+ 1 =
∑
i∈Br(`)
ShpSLi (N, v,B)
v
(Br(`)) .
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• PTCC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and all i ∈ Br(k) ∪ Br(`) are
tc-dependent in v. If h = 0, ShpSL satisfies PTCC because ShpSL coincides with Shp,
PTCC coincides with proportionality and Shp satisfies proportionality (see theorem 5.3
in Besner (2017a)).
Let now h ≥ 1. We get
∑
i∈Br(k)
ShpSLi (N, v,B)− ShpSLi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i))
v
(
Br(k)
)
=
Def.
5.1
1
v(Br(k)
) ∑
i∈Br(k)
[ ∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T )−
∑
T⊆Bh(i), T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T )
]
=
Lem.
3.4
1
v
(
Br(k)
) ∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,T*Bh(i),
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
Kv,T (i)∆v(T )
=
Def.
5.1
1
v
(
Br(k)
) ∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,T*Bh(i),
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[ h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
=
1
v
(
Br(k)
) ∑
T⊆N,T*Bh(k),
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∑
i∈Br(k)
[ h∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
=
1
v
(
Br(k)
) ∑
T⊆N,T*Bh(k),
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[
h∏
j=r
v
(Bj(k))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
·
∑
i∈Br(k)
r−1∏
j=0
v
(Bj(i))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
14
]
∆v(T )
=
1
v
(
Br(k)
) ∑
T⊆N,T*Bh(k),
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[
h∏
j=r
v
(Bj(k))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
=
1
v
(
Br(`)
) ∑
T⊆N,T*Bh(k),
T⊆(Br(k)∪Br(`))
[
h∏
j=r
v
(Bj(`))∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(`),
B∩T 6=∅
v(B)
]
∆v(T )
=
∑
i∈Br(`)
ShpSLi (N, v,B)− Shi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i))
v
(
Br(`)
) .
9.4 Proof of theorem 5.3
By theorem 5.2, we have only to show that ϕ is unique.
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0 arbitrary and ϕ an LS-value which satisfies all
axioms of theorem 5.3. We proceed in several steps.
14If r = 0 we have an empty product, which is equal, by convention, to the multiplicative identity 1.
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Step 1 We denote by vB+ the coalition function where vB+(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ B,
vB+(N) := v(N) and all other coalitions Q ⊆ N are not active in vB+ .
By lemma 9.2 and lemma 9.3, all coalitions T r⊆ Br with related coalitions T r( N, T r /∈
B, are not active in the induced r-th level game (Br, vrB+ ,B
r) ∈ GLBr0 , 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Thus,
by lemma 9.4 and possibly convention 9.1, all Bk, B` ∈ Br with B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) are weakly
dependent in vrB+ , 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and PBC can be applied. We use an induction I1 on
the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h + 1, m := h + 1 − r and an arbitrary i ∈ N to show that∑
j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) is unique for all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1.
Initialisation I1: Let m = 0 and so r = h+ 1. By E,
∑
j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) is unique.
Induction step I1: Assume that
∑
j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) is unique for an arbitary m′, 0 ≤
m′ ≤ h, and so for an r′ := h+ 1−m′, (IH1). It follows, with r := r′ − 1,∑
B∈Br,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) =(PBC)
∑
B∈Br,
B⊆Br+1(i)
v(B)
v
(Br(i)) ∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) =(IH1) c1
⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) = c2, c1, c2 ∈ R uniquely determined.
We obtain that ϕ is unique on all coalition functions vB+ .
Step 2 We denote by vB the coalition function where vB(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ B and
all other coalitions Q ⊆ N are not active in vB. By lemma 3.2, all players i ∈ N are
loyal players and, by L, we have ϕi(N, vB,B) = v({i}), if h = 0, and ϕi(N, vB,B) =
ϕi(Bh(i), vB,Bh−1|Bh(i)), otherwise. In the (h− 1)-th cut of the restriction to Bh(i) we can
apply step 1 and get that ϕ is unique on vB.
Step 3 Let Br+1 ∈ Br+1, Sr ( Br+1, Sr * Br ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and Br|Br+1 the r-th cut
level structure restricted to Br+1. We denote by vSr , vSr ∈ GLB
r+1
0 , the coalition function
where vSr(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , ∆vSr (Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and all other coalitions
R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in vSr .
There exists, by lemma 9.2, exactly one coalition T q ⊆ Bq|Br+1 with related coalition
T q ⊆ Br+1 in the induced q-th level game (Bq|Br+1 , vqSr ,Bqr |Br+1) ∈ GL
Bq |Br+1
0 , 0 ≤ q ≤ r,
such that Sr = ST q from lemma 9.2. We obtain, by lemma 9.3, ∆vqSr
(T q) = ∆v(Sr). All
coalitions Rq⊆ Bq|Br+1 with related coalitions Rq⊆ Br+1, Rq /∈ Br|Br+1 , Rq 6= T q, are not
active in vqSr . Thus, by lemma 9.4 and convention 9.1, all Bk, B` ∈ Bq, B` ⊆ Bq+1 (Bk),
and Bk, B` ⊆ T q are weakly dependent in vqSr and PBC can be applied. By lemma 3.2,
all players i ∈ Br+1\Sr are loyal players in vSr . By L and step 2, we have
ϕi(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) is unique for all i ∈ Br+1\Sr. (13)
We use an induction I2 on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ r, for all levels q, 0 ≤ q ≤ r, with m := r−
q, c3, c4, c5, c6 ∈ R and an arbitrary Bq∈ Bq|Br+1 to show that
∑
j∈Bq ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1)
is uniquely determined.
Initialisation I2: Let i ∈ Sr arbitrary, m = 0 and so q = r. We get∑
B∈Br,
B⊆T r
∑
j∈B
ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) =
(PBC)
∑
B∈Br,
B⊆T r
v(B)
v
(Br(i)) ∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) =
(E)
(13)
c3
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⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) = c4
and
∑
j∈Br ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) is unique for all Br∈ Br|Br+1 .
Induction step I2: Assume that
∑
j∈Bq′ ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) is uniquely determined for
all Bq
′ ∈ Bq′ and m′ := r − q′, 0 ≤ m′ ≤ r − 1, (IH2). It follows for an arbitrary i ∈ Sr,
m := m′ + 1 and so q = q′ − 1,∑
B∈Bq,
B⊆T q,
B⊆Bq+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) =
(PBC)
∑
B∈Bq,
B⊆T q,
B⊆Bq+1(i)
v(B)
v
(Bq(i)) ∑
j∈Bq(i)
ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) =
(IH2)
(13)
c5
⇔
∑
j∈Bq(i)
ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) = c6
and
∑
j∈Bq ϕj(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) is unique for all Bq∈ Bq|Br+1 . So ϕ is unique on vSr , too.
Step 4 Let Br+1 ∈ Br+1, Sr ( Br+1, Sr * Br ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and Br|Br+1 the r-th cut
level structure restricted to Br+1. We denote by vS+r , vS+r ∈ GLB
r+1
0 , the coalition function
where vS+r (B) := v(B) for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , vS+r (Br+1) := v(Br+1), ∆vS+r (Sr) := ∆v(Sr)
and all other coalitions R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in vS+r . Let v′ ∈ GLB
r+1
0 the coalition
function where v′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , ∆v′(Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and all other
coalitions R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in v′ and let v′′ ∈ GLBr+10 the coalition function where
v′′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , v′′(Br+1) := v(Br+1)−v′(Br+1) and all other coalitions
R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in v′′.
We have, by remark 9.5, vS+r = v
′+ v′′. We obtain, by step 3 for v′, step 1 for v′′ and WA,
because v′(B) = v′′(B) for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , that ϕ is unique on vS+r .
Step 5 Let Br+1∈ Br+1, Sr ( Br+1, Sr * Br∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ ` ≤ h, and B`|B`+1(Sr) the `-th
cut level structure restricted to B`+1(Sr). We denote by vS`r , vS`r ∈ GL
B`+1(Sr)
0 , the coalition
function where vS`r(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ B`|B`+1(Sr), ∆vS`r (Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and all other
coalitions R ⊆ B`+1(Sr) are not active in vS`r and we denote by vS`+r , vS`+r ∈ GL
B`+1(Sr)
0 ,
the coalition function where vS`+r (B) := v(B) for all B ∈ B`|B`+1(Sr), vS`+r
(B`+1(Sr)) :=
v
(B`+1(Sr)), ∆v
S`+r
(Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and all other coalitions R ⊆ B`+1(Sr) are not active in
vS`+r . We use an induction I3 on the size `, r ≤ ` ≤ h, to show that ϕ is unique on vS`+r .
Initialisation I3: Let ` = r. Step 4 shows that ϕ is unique on vSr+r because vSr+r = vS+r
from step 4 and thus also on vS`+r if h = 0.
Induction step I3: Assume that ϕ is unique on vS`′+r , r ≤ `′ ≤ h − 1, h ≥ 1 (IH3). Let
` := `′ + 1. In the game vS`r all players are loyal by lemma 3.2. Thus, by L and (IH3),
ϕ is unique on vS`r and, because v is arbitrary, ϕ is also unique on the coalition function
v′′′ ∈ GLB`+1(Sr)0 where v′′′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ B`|B`+1(Sr), ∆v′′′(Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and
all other coalitions R ⊆ B`+1(Sr) are not active in v′′′. By step 1, ϕ is unique on the
coalition function v′′′′ ∈ GLB`+1(Sr)0 , too, where v′′′′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ B`|B`+1(Sr),
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v′′′′
(B`+1(Sr)) := v(B`+1(Sr))− v′′′(B`+1(Sr)) and all other coalitions R ⊆ B`+1(Sr) are not
active in v′′′′.
We have, by remark 9.5, vS`+r = v
′′′+v′′′′. So, by WA, ϕ is unique on vS`+r , 0 ≤ r ≤ ` ≤ h.
Step 6 For each coalition S ∈ ΩN, if S /∈ B, we define vS(B) := v(B)
2n−1
, ∆vS(S) := ∆v(S)
and all other coalitions Q ⊆ N are not active in vS and, if S ∈ B, we define vS(B) := v(B)
2n−1
and all other coalitionsQ ⊆ N are not active in vS. By remark 9.5, we have v =
∑
S∈ΩN vS.
By step 1, 2 and 5 ϕ is unique on vS for all S ∈ ΩN. Thus, by WA, ϕ is uniquely on v.
9.5 Proof of proposition 5.9
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, B ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and (NB, vB,BB) ∈ GLNB a
CS-game to (N, v,B) with related components B′, B′′∈ BB.
If r = 0, {k} := B′ and {`} := B′′, k, ` ∈ NB, we get
ShpSLi (N, v,B) =
Def.
5.1
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Kv,T (i)∆v(T )
=
∑
S⊆N\B,S3i
Kv,S∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\B,S3i
Kv,S∪B∆v(S ∪B)
=
Rem.5.7
Lem.9.4
∑
S⊆NB\{k,`},
S3i
KvB,S∆vB(S) +
∑
S⊆NB\{k,`},
S3i
KvB,S∪{k,`}∆vB(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
T⊆NB, T3i
KvB,T∆vB(T ) =
Def.
5.1
ShpSLi (N
B, vB,BB) for all i ∈ N\B.
Thus we have, by remark 5.7 and lemma 9.4, also in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShpSLBr(i)(Br, vr,Br) = ShpSL(BB)r(i)
(
(BB)r, (vB)r, (BB)r) for all i ∈ N\B
and the claim follows by LG.
9.6 Proof of lemma 5.10
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0 , ϕ an LS-value which satisfies E and CS, B1, B2 ∈
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, B2 ⊆ Br+1(B1), two symmetric components in the r-th level game vr and,
w.l.o.g., Br = {B1, B2, ..., Bt}. We substitute component B1 according to CS by two new
components, component Bt+1 and component Bt+2, (BB1)r := {B2, B3, ..., Bt, Bt+1, Bt+2}
and obtain ∑
i∈B2
ϕi(N
B1, vB1, BB1) =
(CS)
∑
i∈B2
ϕi(N, v,B), (14)
and, if we substitute component B2 according to CS by the same components as before,
Bt+1 and Bt+2, instead, (BB2)r := {B1, B3, ..., Bt, Bt+1, Bt+2}, we have∑
i∈B1
ϕi(N
B2, vB2, BB2) =
(CS)
∑
i∈B1
ϕi(N, v,B), (15)
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where we choose vB2(Bt+1) := v
B1(Bt+1) and v
B2(Bt+2) := v
B1(Bt+2).
In the same manner we substitute now in the game (NB1, vB1, BB1) component B2 by
component Bt+3 and component Bt+4, and analogous in the game (N
B2, vB2, BB2) com-
ponent B1 by the same components as before, Bt+3 and Bt+4, and choose v
B2B1(Bt+3) :=
vB1
B2(Bt+3) and v
B2B1(Bt+4) := v
B1B2(Bt+4). We have, by B2 ⊆ Br+1(B1), in the q-th level
game (BB1B2)q = (BB2B1)q, r ≤ q ≤ h+ 1. So, by remark 5.6, we can choose the structure
of the components of all levels and the worths of the coalitions, which are arbitrary in
the used CS-games15, such that we have
(
NB1
B2, vB1
B2,BB1B2) = (NB2B1, vB2B1,BB2B1) and
get, by E and remark 5.8,∑
i∈Bt+3
ϕi
(
NB1
B2
, vB1
B2
,BB1B2)+ ∑
i∈Bt+4
ϕi
(
NB1
B2
, vB1
B2
,BB1B2)
=
∑
i∈B2
ϕi(N
B1, vB1, BB1) =
(14)
∑
i∈B2
ϕi(N, v,B),∑
i∈Bt+3
ϕi
(
NB2
B1
, vB2
B1
,BB2B1)+ ∑
i∈Bt+4
ϕi
(
NB2
B1
, vB2
B1
,BB2B1)
=
∑
i∈B1
ϕi(N
B2, vB2, BB2) =
(15)
∑
i∈B1
ϕi(N, v,B)
and hence
∑
i∈B1 ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B2 ϕi(N, v,B) and SymBC is shown.
9.7 Proof of lemma 5.11
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0Q , ϕ an LS-value which satisfies E and CS and
therefore, by lemma 5.10, also SymBC, B1, B2 ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, B2 ⊆ Br+1(B1), two
weakly dependent components in the r-th level game vr.
Due to v(B1), v(B2) ∈ Q++ the worths of the components v(Bk), k ∈ {1, 2}, can be
written as a fraction
v(Bk) =
pk
qk
with pk, qk ∈ N.
We choose a main denominator q of these two fractions by q := q1q2. With z1 := p1q2 and
z2 := p2q1 we get
v(B1) =
z1
q
and v(B2) =
z2
q
. (16)
Applying CS (repeatedly) to (N, v,B) and the two components B1, B2 we can get the LS-
game (N ′, v′,B′) where each component Bk, k ∈ {1, 2}, is ”substituted” by zk components
Bk1 to Bk(zk), such that (B′)r = (Br\{B1, B2}) ∪ {B1m : 1 ≤ m ≤ z1} ∪ {B2m : 1 ≤
m ≤ z2} and each component B` ∈ (B′)r\(Br\{B1, B2}) gets a worth v′(B`) = 1q where∣∣(B′)r\(Br\{B1, B2})∣∣ = z1 + z2 and v(Bk) = ∑1≤m≤zk v′(Bkm), k ∈ {1, 2}.
15E. g., regard CS-games where the substituting components are singletons, all levels lower then r contain
only singletons as elements and all players are dependent outside the r-th component.
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All components B` ∈ (B′)r\(Br\{B1, B2}) are symmetric in the r-th level game (v′)r
and subsets of the same component in the (r + 1)-th level. Hence follows, by SymBC,
1
z1
∑
1≤m≤z1
∑
i∈B1m
ϕi(N
′, v′,B′) = 1
z2
∑
1≤m≤z2
∑
i∈B2m
ϕi(N
′, v′,B′).
We obtain, by remark 5.8 and (16),∑
i∈B1
ϕi(N, v,B)
v(B1)
=
∑
i∈B2
ϕi(N, v,B)
v(B2)
.
9.8 Proof of theorem 6.2
Let N ∈N, B = Bh ∈ LN, v, v′∈ GLN0+ and Av,T , Arv,T the expressions according to def. 5.1.
• E, D, L, H, PWC, PTCC: The partial proofs are analogous to the partial proofs of
the proof of theorem 5.2 and therefore omitted.
• CWA: Let v′(S) = c · v(S) for all S ⊆ B, B ∈ Bh, c > 0. It follows Arv,T = Arv′,T and
thus Av,T = Av′,T and we can transfer the proof from WA from theorem 5.2.
• DO: It is well-known that each coalition T ∈ ΩN containing a dummy player j ∈ N
in v is not active in v if T 6= {j}. In eq. (7) we have only to consider active coalitions.
For these coalitions is no change in the coefficients Av,T in the restriction. Thus we get
ShpALi (N, v,B) = ShpALi (N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
• LO: Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN, j ∈ N a loyal player in v and i ∈ N\{j}.
In eq. (7) we have only to consider active coalitions. For these coalitions is no change
in the coefficients Av,T in the following restrictions. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 Bh(i) 6= Bh(j). We have
ShpALi (N, v,B) =
Def.
6.1
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T )
=
∑
T⊆Bh(j),
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N,T3i
T*Bh(j),T3j
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N,T3i
T*Bh(j),j /∈T
Av,T (i)∆v(T )
=
Lem.
3.2
∑
T⊆N,T3i
T*Bh(j), j /∈T
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N\{j},
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T )
= ShpALi
(
N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}
)
.
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Case 2 Bh(i) = Bh(j). Regard, in this case, we always have h ≥ 1. It follows
ShpALi (N, v,B) =
Def.
6.1
∑
T⊆Bh(j),
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N,T3i
T*Bh(j), T3j
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N,T3i
T*Bh(j), j /∈T
Av,T (i)∆v(T )
=
Lem.
3.2
∑
T⊆Bh(i),
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N,T3i
T*Bh(i),j /∈T
Av,T (i)∆v(T )
=
∑
T⊆Bh(i),
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N\{j},
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T )−
∑
T⊆Bh(i)\{j},
T3i
Av,T (i)∆v(T )
= ShpALi
(Bh(i), v,Bh−1|Bh(i))+ ShpALi (N\{j}, v,B|N\{j})
− ShpALi
(Bh(i)\{j}, v,Bh−1|Bh(i)\{j})
and LO is shown.
9.9 Proof of theorem 6.3
By theorem 6.2 we have only to show that ϕ is unique.
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0+ and ϕ an LS-value which satisfies all axioms of
theorem 6.3 and L by lemma 9.6.
If |N | = 1, ϕ is unique by E. Let now |N | ≥ 2, Br+1 ∈ Br+1, Sr ⊆ Br+1, Sr * Br ∈
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and Br|Br+1 the r-th cut level structure restricted to Br+1. We denote
by vSr , vSr ∈ GLB
r+1
0+ , the coalition function where vSr(T ) := v(T ) for all T ⊆ Br and all
Br ∈ Br, Br ⊆ Br+1, vSr(Sr) = cSr , cSr ∈ R arbitrary, and all other coalitions R ⊆ Br+1
are not active in vSr .
We use an induction I1 on the size r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, to show that ϕ is unique for all
LS-games
(
Br+1, v,Br|Br+1
)
.
Initialisation I1: Let r = 0. By lemma 3.2, all players i ∈ Br+1\Sr are loyal players in
vSr . So, by L, ϕi
(
Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1
)
is unique for all i ∈ Br+1\Sr. We have, by lemma 3.4,
all i ∈ Sr are tc-dependent in
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ Sr∑
j∈Sr
ϕj
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
=
(PTCC)
∑
j∈Sr
v({j})
v({i})ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
=
(E)
cSr
and ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
is unique for all i ∈ Sr. Thus, by LO, ϕi
(
Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1
)
is
unique for all i ∈ Sr and so for all games
(
Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1
)
. Because v and cSr
are arbitrary and by CWA and remark 9.5, we obtain that ϕ is unique on all games(
Br+1, v,Br|Br+1
)
if r = 0 and so on all games (N, v,B0) ∈ GLN0+ .
In the following we require h ≥ 1.
Induction step I1: Assume that ϕ is unique on all games
(
Br
′+1, v,Br′ |Br′+1
)
, Br
′+1 ∈
Br′+1, 0 ≤ r′ ≤ h − 1, (IH1). Let r := r′ + 1. By lemma 3.2, all players i ∈ Br+1\Sr
are loyal players in vSr . So, by L and (IH1), ϕi
(
Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1
)
is unique for all
i ∈ Br+1\Sr and we have, by lemma 3.4, all i ∈ Sr are tc-dependent in
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
.
We use an induction I2 on the sizem, 0 ≤ m ≤ r, to show that
∑
i∈B∩Sr ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
is unique for all B ∈ Bq, B ∩ Sr 6= ∅ and q := r −m.
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Initialisation I2: Let m = 0 and so q = r, Bk, B` ∈ Br, Bk, B`∩Sr 6= ∅ and c1, c2, c3, c4 ∈
R. We have, by PTCC, probably using convention 9.1,
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)− ϕi(Bk ∩ Sr, vSr ,Br−1|Bk∩Sr)
v(Bk ∩ Sr)
=
∑
i∈B`∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)− ϕi(B` ∩ Sr, vSr ,Br−1|B`∩Sr)
v(B` ∩ Sr)
⇔
(IH1)
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
v(Bk ∩ Sr) =
∑
i∈B`∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
v(B` ∩ Sr) + c1.
We get∑
B∈Br,
B∩Sr 6=∅
∑
i∈B∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
=
∑
B∈Br,
B∩Sr 6=∅
v(B ∩ Sr)
v(Bk ∩ Sr)
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
+ c2 =
(E)
c3
⇔
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
= c4.
Induction step I2: Assume that
∑
i∈B∩Sr ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
, B ∈ Bq′, B ∩ Sr 6= ∅ is
unique for an arbitrary m′, 0 ≤ m′ ≤ r − 1, and so for a q′ := r −m′, 1 ≤ q′ ≤ r, (IH2).
Let m = m′ + 1 and so q = r −m′ − 1, Bk, B` ∈ Bq, B` ⊆ Bq+1(Bk), Bk, B` ∩ Sr 6= ∅ and
c5, c6, c7, c8 ∈ R. We have, by PTCC, probably using convention 9.1,∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)− ϕi(Br(Bk) ∩ Sr, vSr ,Br−1|Br(Bk)∩Sr)
v(Bk ∩ Sr)
=
∑
i∈B`∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)− ϕi(Br(B`) ∩ Sr, vSr ,Br−1|Br(B`)∩Sr)
v(B` ∩ Sr)
⇔
(IH1)
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
v(Bk ∩ Sr) =
∑
i∈B`∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
v(B` ∩ Sr) + c5.
We get∑
B∈Bq,
B∩Sr 6=∅,
B⊆Bq+1(Bk)
∑
i∈B∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
=
∑
B∈Bq,
B∩Sr 6=∅,
B⊆Bq+1(Bk)
v(B ∩ Sr)
v(Bk ∩ Sr)
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
+ c6 =
(IH2)
c7
⇔
∑
i∈Bk∩Sr
ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
= c8
and ϕi
(
Sr, vSr ,Br|Sr
)
is unique for all i ∈ Sr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Thus, by LO,
ϕi
(
Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1
)
is unique for all i ∈ Sr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and so for all games(
Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1
)
. Because v and cSr are arbitrary and by CWA and remark 9.5, we
obtain that ϕ is unique on all games (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0+ .
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9.10 Proof of theorem 7.3
By theorem 7.2 we have only to show that ϕ is unique.
Let N ∈ N , B = Bh ∈ LN, v ∈ GLN0 and ϕ an LS-value which satisfies all axioms of
theorem 7.3 and L by lemma 9.7. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1 We denote by vB+ the coalition function where vB+(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ B,
vB+(N) := v(N) and all other coalitions Q ⊆ N are not active in vB+ . Let Bk, B` ∈Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk). By lemma 3.4 and convention 9.1 all i ∈ Bk ∪B`
are rc-dependent in vB+ , 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and PWC can be applied. We use an induction
I1 on the size m := h + 1 − r, 0 ≤ m ≤ h + 1, and an arbitrary i ∈ N to show that∑
j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) is unique for all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1.
Initialisation I1: Let m = 0 and so r = h+ 1. By E,
∑
j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) is unique.
Induction step I1: Assume that
∑
j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) is unique for an arbitary m′ :=
h+ 1− r′, 0 ≤ m′ ≤ h, (IH1). Let c1, c2 ∈ R, m = m′ + 1 and so r = r′ − 1. It follows∑
B∈Br,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) =(PWC)
∑
B∈Br,
B⊆Br+1(i)
v(B)
v
(Br(i)) ∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) =(IH1) c1
⇔
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vB+ ,B) = c2.
We obtain that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game (N, vB+ ,B).
Step 2 We denote by vB the coalition function where vB(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ B and
all other coalitions Q ⊆ N are not active in vB. By lemma 3.2, all players i ∈ N are
loyal players and, by L, we have ϕi(N, vB,B) = v({i}), if h = 0, and ϕi(N, vB,B) =
ϕi(Bh(i), vB,Bh−1|Bh(i)), otherwise. In the (h− 1)-th cut of the restriction to Bh(i) we can
apply step 1 and get that ϕ is unique on vB.
Step 3 Let Br+1 ∈ Br+1, Sr ( Br+1, Sr * Br ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and Br|Br+1 the r-th cut
level structure restricted to Br+1. We denote by vSr , vSr ∈ GLB
r+1
0 , the coalition function
where vSr(B) := v(B) for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , ∆vSr (Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and all other coalitions
R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in vSr .
By lemma 3.2, all players i ∈ Br+1\Sr are loyal players in vSr . By L and step 2 we have
that ϕi(B
r+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1) is unique for all i ∈ Br+1\Sr and, by ILO, for all i ∈ Sr, because
we can apply step 1 on the internally induced restrictions. So ϕ is uniquely defined on
(Br+1, vSr ,Br|Br+1).
Step 4 Let Br+1 ∈ Br+1, Sr ( Br+1, Sr * Br ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and Br|Br+1 the r-th cut
level structure restricted to Br+1. We denote by vS+r , vS+r ∈ GLB
r+1
0 , the coalition function
where vS+r (B) := v(B) for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , vS+r (Br+1) := v(Br+1), ∆vS+r (Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and
all other coalitions R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in vS+r .
Let v′ ∈ GLBr+10 the coalition function where v′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , ∆v′(Sr) :=
∆v(Sr) and all other coalitions R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in v′ and let v′′ ∈ GLBr+10 the
coalition function where v′′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , v′′(Br+1) := v(Br+1)−v′(Br+1)
and all other coalitions R ⊆ Br+1 are not active in v′′.
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We have, by remark 9.5, vS+r = v
′+ v′′. We obtain, by step 3 for v′, step 1 for v′′ and WA,
because v′(B) = v′′(B) for all B ∈ Br|Br+1 , that ϕ is unique on (Br+1, vS+r ,Br|Br+1).
Step 5 Let Br+1 ∈ Br+1, Sr ( Br+1, Sr * Br ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ q ≤ h, and Bq|Bq+1(Sr) the
q-th cut level structure restricted to Bq+1(Sr). By vSqr , vSqr ∈ GLB
q+1(Sr)
0 , we denote the
coalition function where vSqr (B) := v(B) for all B ∈ Bq|Bq+1(Sr), ∆vSqr (Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and
all other coalitions R ⊆ Bq+1(Sr) are not active in vSqr and by vSq+r , vSq+r ∈ GL
Bq+1(Sr)
0 ,
the coalition function where vSq+r (B) := v(B) for all B ∈ Bq|Bq+1(Sr), vSq+r
(Bq+1(Sr)) :=
v
(Bq+1(Sr)), ∆v
S
q+
r
(Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and all other coalitions R ⊆ Bq+1(Sr) are not active in
vSq+r . We use an induction I2 on the size q, r ≤ q ≤ h, to show that ϕ is unique on vSq+r .
Initialisation I2: Let q = r. Step 4 shows that ϕ is unique on vSr+r because vSr+r = vS+r .
Induction step I2: Assume that ϕ is unique on vSq˜+r , r ≤ q˜ ≤ h − 1, (IH2). Let q :=
q˜ + 1. In the game vSqr all players are loyal by lemma 3.2. Thus, by L and (IH2), ϕ
is unique on vSqr and, because v is arbitrary, ϕ is also unique on the coalition function
v′ ∈ GLBq+1(Sr)0 where v′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ Bq|Bq+1(Sr), ∆v′(Sr) := ∆v(Sr) and
all other coalitions R ⊆ Bq+1(Sr) are not active in v′. By step 1, ϕ is unique on the
coalition function v′′ ∈ GLBq+1(Sr)0 , too, where v′′(B) :=
v(B)
2
for all B ∈ Bq|Bq+1(Sr),
v′′
(Bq+1(Sr)) := v(Bq+1(Sr))− v′(Bq+1(Sr)) and all other coalitions R ⊆ Bq+1(Sr) are not
active in v′′.
We have, by remark 9.5, vSq+r = v
′+v′′. So, by WA, ϕ is unique on vSq+r for 0 ≤ r ≤ q ≤ h.
Step 6 For each coalition S ∈ ΩN, if S /∈ B, we define vS(B) := v(B)
2n−1
, ∆vS(S) := ∆v(S)
and all other coalitions Q ⊆ N are not active in vS and, if S ∈ B, we define vS(B) := v(B)
2n−1
and all other coalitionsQ ⊆ N are not active in vS. By remark 9.5, we have v =
∑
S∈ΩN vS.
By step 1, 2 and 5 ϕ is unique on (N, vS,B) for all S ∈ ΩN. Thus, by WA, ϕ is uniquely
defined on all (N, v,B) ∈ GLN0 .
9.11 Logical independence
All axiomatizations must hold also for a trivial level structure B0 and in this case all
axioms used for axiomatization coincide with axioms for TU-values. So the given axiom-
atizations coincide in this case with axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value.
These axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value use logical independent axioms
what is is well-known or easy to prove. Therefore all axioms for LS-values are also logical
independent in the given axiomatizations.
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